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Planet Hallyuwood’s Political Vulnerabilities: Censuring the 





South Korea’s cinema has recently enjoyed a Golden Age that 
has opened up new spaces for creative and cultural expression 
in Korea and probably in the larger Asia-Pacific region. 
Domestic market share of local films, lucrative pre-sales, a 
robust screen quota and fresh genre-bending narratives and 
styles have attracted admiration in Korea and abroad. However, 
since its peak of success in late 2005 and early 2006, extreme 
competition between domestic films, piracy and illegal 
downloading, halving of the screen quota and the erosion of 
ancillary markets have impacted on the industry’s ability to 
sustain vitality and profitability. Among the challenges facing 
the next decade of growth in the Asia-Pacific is ‘censorship’, 
which was supposed to have been eliminated in Korea in 1996 
by a change in government policy. A case study of Im Sang-
soo’s The President's Last Bang (2005) illustrates how a 
representative 386 Generation filmmaker has encountered and 
resisted startling attempts to suppress freedom of expression. A 
theoretical framework for exposing and opposing intimidation 
in defamation and censorship struggles is applied to this case, 
and the methods used by each side to attain their goals are 
analyzed. It is hoped this analysis will stimulate a deeper 
understanding of how Korea’s nascent national cinema engages 
with sensitive social issues as part of its transformation from a 
national to a supranational cinema, or what we might call 
‘Planet Hallyuwood’ – the fusing of Hallyu (Korean Wave) and 
Hollywood.
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Challenges for the Korean Cinema1 
 
Censorship across parts of the Asia-Pacific region is impacting 
significantly on creativity and the freedom of expression, primarily due 
to the close scrutiny of scripts and the cutting of final prints by 
government officials and by restrictive rating systems. In South Korea 
(hereafter Korea) by law censorship is non-existent, however, different 
ways of curtailing and criticizing freedom of expression have arisen in 
place of official government regulation. This article analyzes a new 
mode of ‘censureship’ dynamics, that is, the expression of disapproval, 
criticism and blame for contributing something provocative to Korea’s 
contemporary entertainment cinema. A case study of director/writer Im 
Sang-soo’s 2005 so-called historical-fictitious film The President's Last 
Bang is used to illustrate the methods that representative filmmakers 
have used to overcome the oppression of creative and cultural 
expression, which is one of the complexities shaping the cinematic 
component of Hallyu or ‘Korean wave’ of popular culture spreading 
throughout East Asia and beyond. A theoretical framework for 
overcoming censorship struggles (Jansen and Martin 2003; Gray and 
Martin 2006) is applied to the strong expression of disapproval 
surrounding The President's Last Bang, and the methods used by each of 
the players in this case and how they obtained their goals are analyzed 
on the basis of published accounts. Despite all its glory, the Korean 
Cinema has experienced a dark side that continues to brew in the post-
2006 downturn. The startling legal reprimanding of The President's Last 
Bang points to one of the significant burdens confronting not only the 
Korean cinema but also cinemas across the Asia-Pacific as they 
transform and look for new collaborations between diverse cultures and 
                                                          
1 An earlier and shorter version of this article was presented at the 5th Korean 
Studies Association of Australasia (KSAA) Biennial Conference held at Curtin 
University of Technology, Perth, Australia, 12–13 July 2007. The author thanks 
colleagues and friends Brian Martin, Kim Hyae-joon, Mark Russell and Ae-
Gyung Shim as well as the anonymous referees for their helpful comments. A 
Korea Foundation Advanced Research Grant enabled valuable industry and 
archive research to be conducted for this study.    
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regulatory environments.2 Not only is it likely that this article could 
open up a large can of worms, but also it is hoped it might stimulate 
discussion about Korean filmmakers in the post-Golden Age testing 
uncharted waters in their search for the next decade of growth. 
The history of national cinemas in the Asia-Pacific region is 
plagued with gaping holes, and Korea’s cinematic history is not without 
exception. Recent studies and edited collections such as Lee and Choe 
(1998), Lee (2000), James and Kim (2002), Kim (2002), Min, Joo and 
Kwak (2003), Kim (2004), McHugh and Abelmann (2005), Shin and 
Stringer (2005), Yi (2005), Yecies (2005), Jin (2006), Kim and An 
(2006), Yecies (2007) and Gateward (2007) provide new understandings 
of the little-known history of one of the hottest pan-Asian cinemas: the 
so-called New Korean Cinema. What binds these groundbreaking 
studies together is their contribution to the larger synthesis of what we 
might call ‘Planet Hallyuwood’ – the fusing of Hallyu and Hollywood.3 
The Korean cinema has become a ‘full service cinema’, which embraces 
‘a full range of modes of production and consumption’ (Berry 2002: 1). 
Apart from its lion’s share of the domestic exhibition market and fresh 
genre experimentation and narrative styles, the global recognition of the 
                                                          
2 Co-production treaties serve as one of the key means of engaging with other 
countries and facilitating transnational cultural flows. As of September 2008, 
New Zealand had co-production agreements with Australia, Britain, Canada, 
France, Italy, Singapore, Germany, Ireland, Spain and Korea. Australia has co-
production arrangements with Britain, Canada, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Singapore and China, as well as memorandums of understanding with France 
and New Zealand (with negotiations underway with South Africa). Korea has 
co-production treaties with France in addition to New Zealand, but co-
productions need not go through treaties to apply for government and semi-
government (Korean Film Council, KOFIC) support programs and investment 
funds. In China, treaty negotiations are underway with France, which if 
successful will enable French filmmakers to gain never-before-seen access to 
the Chinese market. Upon completion, this will be China's fourth international 
co-production treaty along with Canada, Italy and Australia. 
3 Since early 2000, Hallyu – an intensive and extensive wave of popular culture 
– has been thrilling non-Korean fans and critics alike in Japan, China and 
Southeast Asia, as well as parts of the Middle East, Europe, and North and 
Latin America. 
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Korean cinema has focused on excellence in proactive film policy. 
Combined, these variables have helped filmmakers to breathe a 
universality into their narratives and characters while maintaining a 
distinct Korean sentiment. New spaces for freedom of expression have 
undoubtedly helped filmmakers achieve this aim. Yet, many important 
studies overlook the long-term impact censorship has had on the shaping 




Censorship Struggles in the 1990s 
 
Government and industry regulations as well as self-censorship efforts 
and the personal views of censorship and ratings board members make 
‘freedom of expression’ a slippery and complex term. In addition, 
economics and conventional business models in the pursuit of profits 
also shape the formation of content – particularly by those who control 
the investments behind content production. Essentially, freedom of 
expression exists in shades and nuances defined by changing social 
norms, ideals, attitudes and beliefs, and differing – often competing – 
cultural perspectives around the world. Simply put, it is the autonomy to 
convey ideas and opinions no matter which medium is used, often 
resulting in the questioning of dominant ideologies and power structures. 
Throughout history, those who have challenged preconceived 
understandings of controversial topics such as obscenity (pornography), 
profanity, religion, violence and expressed critical views of governments 
and authority figures often have been fined, jailed, persecuted (banned 
from making films) or even killed for upsetting these arbitrarily 
established views. In film industries where heavy government 
interference exists, freedom of expression primarily has been limited by 
the censoring of scripts and final prints – particularly in regards to 
representing nudity, to glorifying violence and to critiquing the 
government and/or society (in which case would make the government 
look bad). In the case of Korea, recent censorship cases have been used 
as a tool to challenge regulatory conventions as well as to generate 
exploitative attention by particular filmmakers. 
Within the recent historical context of censorship in Korea, the 
year 1996 is a watershed year, a year when the Constitutional Court 
ruled (on 4 October 1996) that pre-censorship regulations enacted by the 
Performance Ethics Board (a.k.a. the Korean Performing Arts Promotion 
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Committee, KPAPC) under the Film Promotion Law were 
unconstitutional. The Performance Ethics Board’s so-called 
‘deliberation’ system, which had exercised a heavy hand over 
storytelling since 1984 (under Motion Picture Law revisions), no longer 
had any power to restrict freedom of expression. In its place, the 
government initiated a rating system that provided a greater range of 
classification possibilities. Suddenly, the low-hanging ceiling that had 
been restricting creativity exploded, providing the impetus for both 
arthouse and commercial filmmakers to turn enthusiastically toward 
fresh ideas. It is precisely this moment that most scholars attribute to the 
fundamental beginnings of the Korean cinema’s latest Golden Age.4 
Within a relatively short period of time, a brood of talented filmmakers 
and writers began drawing local, regional and international attention to a 
host of new cinematic possibilities, which prior to 1996 under the 
Motion Picture Law had been stifled.5  
Since 1996, in spite of the nullification of so-called censorship 
laws, a residual form of censorship has continued under the rubric of the 
ratings classification system. In 1998, both Jang Sun-woo's Bad Movie 
and Im Sang-soo's Girls' Night Out were self-censored (re-edited) under 
compulsion by threat by the Performance Ethics Board. Then in 1999, 
                                                          
4  The Korean cinema’s earliest ‘Golden Age’ dates back to the mid-to-late 
1920s when a ‘boom’ in silent filmmaking occurred during the Japanese 
colonial period (1910-1945). A second Golden Age appears to have occurred 
during the 1960s when an abundance of tear-jerking melodrama genre films 
was produced to meet government-urged industry quotas. Producers who 
successfully met these quotas received lucrative licenses from the government 
to import select Hollywood films. Its most recent Golden Age can be said to 
have begun in 1996 with the lifting of government regulations and a subsequent 
explosion of creativity.   
5 Prior to 1996, the Motion Picture Law, which took effect in 1962 under the 
Park Chung-hee dictatorship, required all filmmakers to obtain script (pre-
production) approval from the Ministry of Public Information (hereafter MPI) 
and to give the government the right to the ‘final cut’ on completed films. All 
filmmakers also had to register with the government, and every film, whether 
domestic or foreign, required government permission to leave or enter the 
country. Park’s regime as well the  military governments that came after 
ultimately used the Motion Picture Law, that is, outright censorship, to nurture 
films that proselytized anti-communist ideology. Ironically, erotic ‘hostess’ 
genre films became popular (and widely tolerated by the government) while 
narratives that criticized the government’s anti-communist ideology (and the 
government) were forbidden. 
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the film Yellow Hair received a three-month rating suspension – the first 
of its kind after the Media Ratings Board was established and the rating 
system was implemented (in mid 1999) – for containing a ménage à 
trios scene. During the ‘rating-pending’ period, that is, after the Media 
Ratings Board refused to rate the film – effectively making a domestic 
release impossible – the film’s producer was forced to delete 
controversial scenes and then re-apply for a new rating, which became 
18 plus. In the following year, the Media Ratings Board refused twice to 
rate a different film called Yellow Flower, which portrayed explicit, 
strange sex acts (in the tradition of Nagisa Oshima's In the Realm of the 
Senses (1976) and Murakami's Tokyo Decadence (1992)). The film’s 
producer Gwak Young-soo from Indiestory took the case to the Seoul 
Administrative Court and then the Korean Constitutional Court, which 
eventually found the Media Ratings Board guilty of violating freedom of 
expression. Whether circuitously or not, the aforementioned filmmakers 
bravely began laying stepping-stones for the greater freedom of 
expression.6 
The next film to be rejected outright by the Media Ratings 
Board was Jang Sun-woo’s Lies (2000), which is Korea’s third film ever 
to be invited to compete in the Venice International Film Festival. This 
case stands apart from the pack because it is one of the first instances in 
which a filmmaker strategically set out to challenge directly the Board’s 
authority and to maximize media attention for the film and its 
controversialism. Given that Jang Jeong-il’s banned novel Tell Me a Lie 
involved the sexual escapades between a high school student and a 38-
year old artist – sending writer Jang Jeong-il to jail – director Jang 
cleverly used the filmed version to cause a sensation. Only days before 
Venice, the Media Ratings Board refused to rate Lies, thus making it 
impossible for it to be distributed in Korea. Around the same time, the 
Association of Citizens Against Media Encouraging Obscenity and 
Violence lashed out against Jang Sun-woo and his producer Shin Chul. 
Finally, after multiple and lengthy suspensions by the Media Ratings 
Board, the filmmakers conceded to the hiding of private parts, but 
refused to change key elements in the script. A few other films such as 
Too Young To Die (2002), portraying a seventy-something year old 
                                                          
6 Thanks in part to the efforts of these particular filmmakers, internationally-
acclaimed films such as Ang Lee’s Lust and Caution (2007), which contains 
explicit sexual-acrobatic lovemaking scenes, could be exhibited (and sold) in 
Korea without being cut. 
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couple having sex, have experienced similar censorship challenges and 
has also benefited from an ensuing media campaign.7 The timing of Lies 
and Too Young To Die represents a type of advanced maturity in artistic 
freedom of expression. 
The aforementioned cases, along with a batch of foreign films 
such as Shortbus (2006), Battle In Heaven (2005), Kill Bill Vol. 1 (2003), 
Wayward Cloud (2005), Eyes Wide Shut (1999), Happy Together (1997) 
and Tokyo Decadence (1992) have aroused deep questions about film 
censorship in Korea and its relationship to the portrayal of ‘obscene’ and 
violent content in public as well as the status of films receiving ‘limited 
screening’ or delayed ratings.8 Combined, their experiences before the 
Media Ratings Board have generated a particular kind of energy aimed 
at changing the disapproving attitudes and perceptions of this particular 
aspect of freedom of expression.9 Yet, unlike in the above cases, few 
other filmmakers and producers in the Korean Cinema’s post-1996 era 
have had to fight so hard against litigation directed at the political 
gagging of a story as Im Sang-soo. 
 
 
                                                          
7  According to Darcy Paquet (2002), the first known occurrence of a film 
attracting a restricted rating is the nearly five-hour North Korean television 
documentary called Animal Copulation (1987), which portrays animal sex 
organs. 
8  Battle in Heaven (imported by World Cinema) is an interesting and 
particularly important case because it is one of the films that successfully used 
the Korean court system to get the vague standards behind the ‘limited 
screening’ rating from the Media Ratings Board deemed as unconstitutional. 
Before the appeal to the Seoul Administration Court and then the Constitutional 
Court, the film, which contained exposed private parts, was restricted to being 
shown at limited cinemas, and nearly all advertisement and DVD releases were 
banned. However, a lack of appropriate screening venues to service films with 
this type of rating effectively resulted in the prohibition of said films, thus 
making Ratings Board decisions of this type unconstitutional in the Court’s 
view. 
9 Changes made to a number of domestic and foreign film posters such as Bad 
Guy (2001), The Game of Their Lives (2002), 3-Iron (2004), The Grudge (2004), 
Everybody Has Secrets (2004), Lady Chatterley (2006), Share Living and Joy 
(2007), Never Forever (2007) and The Cut (2007) – that is the toning down of 
their sexually provocative/suggestive images and words (including in some 
cases representations of North Korea and horrific ghosts) – have also 
contributed to the larger but under-discussed debate about censorship. 




Apart from studies on wars, military operations and business dealings, 
rarely does one encounter analyses of tactics and backfire strategies used 
by members of national film industries to achieve a set of goals. 
Valuable studies on film censorship such as Butters (2007), Robb (2004), 
Lewis (2000), Petrie (1997), Couvares (1996), Jacobs (1991) Robertson 
(1989), Gardner (1987) and Randall (1970) abound. However, there is a 
dearth of attention given to the specific methods that filmmakers use for 
exposing and opposing intimidation in defamation and censorship 
struggles across World cinemas. The Korean cinema provides a fertile 
source of such cases because of its long history of massive censorship, 
which needs sustained discussion elsewhere. 
The President's Last Bang (2005) is the main focus in the 
remainder of this study because from the start the script promised to 
become one of Korea’s most controversial commercial entertainment 
feature films. Posters for the English-language market appear below in 
Figure 1. First, there is the subject matter that broached the topic of Park 
Chung-hee’s death in a critical yet black-comic way. Second, is the 
provocative reputation surrounding Im and his methods for getting the 
film made in the first instance. Third, are the reputations surrounding 
producers Shim Jae-myung (who is politically savvy in her own right) 
and Shin Chul and executive producer Lee Eun who between them 
developed trailblazing reputations for producing wild and successful 
films such as Kim Jee-woon’s The Quiet Family (1998), Jang Sun-woo’s 
Lies (2000), Kim Ki-duk’s The Isle (2000), Park Chan-wook’s Joint 
Security Area (2000) and Kwak Jae-yong’s My Sassy Girl (2001). The 
synergy running through Im’s project was built upon the energies of 
these three variables as well as the talents of his production crew.  
 





      Figure 1: Film posters courtesy of MK Pictures and Kino Video 
 
Whereas the English subtitles on the 2005 censored DVD 
version of The President's Last Bang say that it is based on a true story, 
Im is quoted as saying that the story is his personal, truthful account of 
the events of one night (Bertolin 2005). Those who have met or 
interviewed Im soon gather that his understanding of this night in 
question was derived from his own memories and thorough research of 
the period.10 Yet, if one digs deep, documents regarding the incident 
abound. For instance, a minute-by-minute overview of the assassination 
appears in English in the Korea Annual, 1980, which is published by 
Hapdong News Agency, one of Korea’s longest-standing and largest 
independent commercial news companies. This fascinating journal issue 
presents a five-page discussion of the assassination as the number one 
highlight of 1979, and a seventeen-page, mind-altering investigative 
report, including the indictment against Kim Jae-gyu (KCIA Agency 
Chief), the assassin of President Park who apparently was acting under 
the illusion of obtaining political power, and the court-martial verdict 
against all nine men involved. Minute details in the report, such as 
                                                          
10 The author thanks Im Sang-soo for sharing his personal thoughts and insights 
during conversations held at Pusan International Film Festival #10 in October 
2005 and during the Chungmuro International Film Festival in September 2008. 
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descriptions of gloomy facial expressions, aspersions cast at the 
President’s staff and verbatim quotes such as “I will finish him off 
tonight”; “Your Excellency, do you think you can make good politics by 
working with this worm-like guy?”; the President’s chief bodyguard 
(Cha Ji-chol) is a “headache’’ and “When you hear gun shots in the room 
(the restaurant), you eliminate the President’s bodyguards. Are you 
ready?” partly made it Im’s script in waiting. 
 
Figure 2: At about 6 minutes into the film, a doctor (played by Im 
Sang-soo) advises KCIA Director Kim (played by Baek Yoon-sik) to 
improve his health by resigning from Park Chung-hee’s brutal 
regime. KCIA Agent Colonel Min (played by Kim Eung-soo) is 
pictured screen-right holding a two-way radio. Permission to use all 
still images from the film is granted by MK Pictures and SBS TV 
Australia. 
 
As a 386 Generation filmmaker – that is, someone who was in 
their thirties during the 1990s (born in the 1960s) and enrolled in 
university in the 1980s – Im has participated in the global promotion of 
the Korean cinema by telling provocative stories that transcend national 
and cultural borders. Being part of this generation is significant to this 
overall picture because it is Im’s age group that formed the head, legs 
and voice of the pro-democracy movement to end Korea’s military 
dictatorship. Filmmakers under this label trained at international and 
domestic film schools and have drawn upon their first-hand experience 
of witnessing and living-through one of Korea’s most radical periods, 
which includes the Kwang-ju massacre, student demonstrations, other 
intensive protests organized before world media at the 1988 Seoul 
Olympics, the end of the military regime and the subsequent victorious 
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rise of democracy.11 In the 1980s Im was a Sociology major at Yonsei 
University, which was a center for the student movement at that time. 
Hence, he has experienced and lived through social, political and 
cultural burdens and learned how to combat censorship after 1996, in an 
era when few could imagine that restrictions of freedom of expression 
still existed. One could say that Im’s generation has provided the 
backbone for the Korean cinema’s rise to local, regional and 
international fame – all while making films before and after censorship 
was found to be unconstitutional. Each filmmaker in their own way has 
reflected on Korea’s modern history – a history about surviving 
prolonged dictatorship, rapid industrialization and economic crisis. 
Although Korean filmmakers have practised their trade under these 
challenging constraints for nearly half a century, it has been the 386 
Generation filmmakers who have come of age by experiencing first-
hand the lifting of rigorous state censorship in the mid-1990s. 
The President's Last Bang imagines what authoritarian President 
Park Chung-hee’s last night on earth (26 October 1979) was like before 
the director of Korea’s Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) assassinated 
him at close range with a West German-made 32 caliber gun. At the 
same time, the narrative encompasses more than a single night in Park’s 
life. The film surreptitiously portrays the 18-year gamut of his 
dictatorship by implication, depicting the one night when the 
assassination took place as a template for understanding and critiquing 
this man who was and still is revered by his country. Scenes in which his 
political opponents were imprisoned and tortured, and socialists or 
liberalists were unjustly accused of being North Korean spies serve as 
acute reminders of what occurred during Park’s reign. By the same token, 
we see Park’s sexual inclinations and indulgences, which are 
exemplified by the portrayal of women in the scene from Figure 3. We 
are also exposed to unwavering views of Park’s coercive ideals and 
policies as a means to facilitate patriotism (seen in Figure 4, his pro-
Japanese disposition (he was an officer in the Japanese army during the 
Japanese colonial period), and finally his fascist ideology regarding 
                                                          
11  Im’s filmography, which confronts contemporary issues of sexuality, 
infidelity, youth street life and political history includes Girls' Night Out (1998), 
Tears (2000), A Good Lawyer's Wife (2003) and The Old Garden (2006).His 
portfolio demonstrates that he has always been interested in probing deeply into 
the thorny issues of Korea’s transformative past. Investigating Korea’s breaking 
family system and looking at the 1980 Kwang-ju Massacre from a distance 
have been part of his Modus operandi. 
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atomic armament and Korea’s overall relationship with the US 
government. Perhaps for those who hold only high, endearing views of 
Park and his Presidency, these strong views are somewhat painful to bear, 
thus making Im’s film one of the first to broach this ‘taboo’ subject. 
Figure 3: Topless girls swimming in President Park Chung-hee’s pool 
on the day of his assassination. This scene proceeds the black screen 
time where the documentary footage was deleted from the film’s 2005 
version. Permission by MK Pictures and SBS TV Australia. 
 
Figure 4: KCIA Chief Agent Ju (played by Han Seok-kyu) appearing in 
the doorway of the KCIA’s torture chambers while democracy 
advocates are being brutalized and humiliated. Permission by MK 
Pictures and SBS TV Australia. 
 
Fluid cinematography brings the audience on an intense journey 
as KCIA Chief Kim decides that ‘tonight is the night’ to kill the 
president – in the name of ‘democracy’. We follow KCIA Chief Agent 
Ju and KCIA Agent Colonel Min as they collude to kill the President at a 
private dinner banquet. A fierce, bloody gun battle ensues between 
President Park’s bodyguards and KCIA agents after KCIA Director Kim 
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shoots the President, splattering his blood at the banquet dinner table. 
The positioning of the characters in Figures 5 and 6 below represents the 
intensity of the event. The result is chaos among Park’s military ranks as 
they jockey for position and attempt to maintain civil order. The film 
offers a fleeting but intriguing and undoubtedly satirical perspective of 
Park Chung-hee, who remains nameless throughout the film or is simply 
referred to as the highly respectable one (gakha). 
 
Figure 5: KCIA Director Kim shooting the President's Chief 
Bodyguard Cha (for the second time) after the initial shooting of he 
and President Park. Permission by MK Pictures and SBS TV 
Australia. 
 
Figure 6: In a final fit of madness, KCIA Director Kim gathers the 
guts to shoot the President at close range. Permission by MK 
Pictures and SBS TV Australia. 
 
On 31 January 2005, only three days before the film’s scheduled 
public release in Korea, the Seoul Central Court mandated that parts of 
the film be cut. This move was prompted by litigation filed by the son of 
the late President Park, Park Ji-man, who was using this official channel 
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as a mode of attack. He sought to get the film banned. Im was familiar 
with censorship in Korea because in 1998 his Girls' Night Out film was 
re-edited under duress in order to conform to suggestions made by the 
Performance Ethics Board. Yet, nothing could have prepared him for the 
blame and harsh criticism that was directed at The President's Last 
Bang. The Korean daily newspaper Donga-A Ilbo reported that Park Ji-
man argued the opening and closing credits’ inclusion of stills and 
footage of actual protest marches and of his father’s funeral ceremony 
blurred the boundaries between fact and fiction (Cho 2005). For the 
beginning scene, Im used archival footage of outraged Korean students 
and citizens in Pusan and Masan holding violent demonstrations in 1979 
against President Park’s regime, demanding democratization. These pro-
democracy protests in which military tanks overpowered the crowds 
were staged about two weeks before Park’s death. Archival footage at 
the end shows some of the same people who had protested against the 
dictatorship shedding tears in the streets in the center of Seoul during the 
grand funeral for President Park. Regardless of age and sex, people 
mourned bitterly in this footage. These two radically different views 
reflect on Park’s existence in dynamic ways, offering holistic insights 
into the story and the film. Simply put, the film was feared as a 
disturbance to the privacy of the Park family. Park’s legal threats aimed 
explicitly at suppressing the film and discrediting its contents, while 
implicitly attempting to damage and devalue Im’s reputation, as if Im 
were committing some type of crime against the nation. 
After all, President Park is considered by many to be the father 
of Korea and the one responsible for industrializing Korea and bringing 
it out of poverty. Under his regime, conglomerates such as Samsung, 
Hyundai and LG grew beyond imagination, becoming among some the 
world leaders in their fields. With Park’s support, small newspapers have 
become media conglomerates. An upper-middle class was born under his 
regime as well. With this in mind, the people behind these companies 
and organizations are the same people who essentially run Korea today. 
Hence, it is understandable that these people are against seeing a film 
dealing with the darker side of Park and his assassination. This is 
precisely why the film’s subject matter ranks as highly taboo. This is 
also why Korea’s largest distributor, CJ Entertainment – a sister 
company of Samsung – eventually refused to distribute Im’s film, 
withdrawing its investment at the last minute. For Im, after so many 
years since Park’s death, it is difficult to find a rational linkage between 
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the decisions made by CJ and the thinking behind the others who 
attacked the film and the thinking of the people in the historical footage. 
According to Jansen and Martin (2004) and Gray and Martin 
(2006), in defamation and censorship struggles there are several methods 
and counter-methods employed by attackers and opponents respectively. 
Five commonly-recurring methods used to block outrage against 
oppression, that is, to prevent backfire against censorship are: 1) to 
cover-up the events; 2) to devalue the target; 3) to reinterpret the story 
and/or facts; 4) to appear to be seeking justice through official channels 
and procedures; and 5) to intimidate. Conversely, then, for opponents, 
exacerbating outrage against oppression and increasing backfire, that is, 
decreasing the efforts of the attacker include: 1) to promote exposure to 
and publicity of the event/case; 2) to legitimize the status or stature of 
the attacked; 3) to offer a different interpretation to the story and/or 
facts; 4) to utilize unofficial channels to expose the injustice of the 
attack; and 5) to simply stand up against the coercion. Backfire, as the 
term suggests, happens when a censorship case and its subsequent 
publicity and/or exposure unexpectedly increases awareness of the event 
and public support for the attacked as opposed to blocking the event 
from public view (Jansen and Martin 2003). 
Park Ji-man’s legal action attempted to use the law to 
simultaneously gag The President's Last Bang and to discredit its 
potentially defaming and libellous script, that is, to direct blame against 
the film for showing contempt against the Park family. Although the 
Court believed the film to be a fictional spoof that audiences would 
interpret as a story based on false events, Park Ji-man was successful, at 
least initially, in getting the film censored. As a result of the Court’s 
decision, Im and producer MK Pictures were left with two options: 1) to 
please the court and cut scenes from the film, or 2) to ignore the court 
order and pay $30,000 USD in fines for each time the pre-censored 
version of the film was commercially screened in cinemas or on TV, 
which potentially could lead to the prevention of all future public 
screenings of the film in Korea. The filmmaker acquiesced to the first 
option and deleted scenes with documentary footage. However, he 
launched a counter anti-censorship promotional strategy, which is 
discussed below.  
Draconian and politically-motivated disapproval of the film 
surfaced in an era of supposedly newfound freedom of expression. On 
the one hand, Im Sang-soo’s deconstruction of President Park’s mythical 
aura was perceived as being too audacious and downright dishonoring 
52                                  Planet Hallyuwood’s Political Vulnerabilities 
 
given the high profile that Park’s daughter Park Geun-hye occupied as 
chairwoman of the centre-right opposition party in Korea at the time. Yet, 
on the other hand, controversy was fuelled by what was snipped from 
the film; Im was ordered to delete nearly four minutes of documentary 
footage because of Park Ji-man’s litigation. Hence, the film’s narrative 
created hullabaloo on all sides of the picture. The English title did use a 
risqué double-entendre use of ‘bang’ to mean sexual intercourse and 
opening scenes of bikini-clad women exposing their supple breasts did 
set a perverse scene for the President’s domicile. And, call girls lined up 
(with their mothers) to give President Park – in the words of one of the 
characters – ‘what he wanted’ and ‘what made him happy’. Moreover, 
the film’s excessive portrayal of guns, violence, vulgar language and the 
gory splattering of the President’s blood was used to depict a dirty old 
man who had students, democracy leaders and other alleged communist 
sympathizers humiliated and brutalized in the KCIA torture chambers 
(as represented above in Figure 4). There is no mistake that the film 
ventured in provocative and uncharted ‘taboo’ waters – with Im’s full 
knowledge of what he was doing. However, a maturing democracy in a 
developed country that has eliminated censorship is supposed to nurture 
such ventures, or at least one might think a society of this statute would 
have the confidence, endurance and reflexive skills to face critical albeit 
painful views of its recent history.  
Upon hearing news of the Court’s decision, members of the 
Korean Motion Picture Association (KMPA) and Director’s CUT (a 
young directors group) exposed what happened. They expressed outrage 
at multiple press conferences that they organized on behalf of Im and the 
film industry, and published articles on Pressian.com, a political news 
website based in Seoul. The Court’s decision was interpreted as nothing 
more than a brutal suppression of freedom of expression (Kim 2005). 
From the view of the filmmakers, this type of draconian reaction was a 
setback for creativity and a limitation on the democratic expression of 
opinions and ideas. After 1996 film censorship had been considered as a 
thing of Korea’s past semi-democratic and authoritarian governments. 
Despite being hacked, Im’s visually stunning film was invited as an 
official selection to the Cannes, New York, Toronto and Telluride film 
festivals. Im resisted Park’s legal intimidation by using his Q & A 
sessions, media interviews and general social interactions with non-
Koreans to protest against the censorship of his film. He also received 
support from festival authorities for his film, and used these situations 
strategically and opportunistically to expand his protest campaign. A 
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crucial technique was keeping black screen time in the film where the 
deleted scenes initially would have appeared. This alone served as a 
vivid reminder of what was going on and a signifier of the censorship. In 
itself the black screen time and what it represents speaks louder than any 
documentary footage could have, promoting the film and its self-styled 
taboo script in unimaginable ways. The backlash was intensified in print 
and by word-of-mouth across the globe by reporters, critics, academics, 
industry people and cinephiles who homed in on the international 
declaration of protest symbolized by the black screen time. News stories, 
interviews and reviews divulged details about the censorship case, 
fuelling Im Sang-soo’s reputation as some kind of cine-agent 
provocateur, and furthering Im’s recognition beyond that of a low-
budget filmmaker who makes films about sexy women and frustrated 
youth. He is one of the New Korean Cinema’s maverick filmmakers. In 
this sense maybe the film’s censorship backfired because Im’s methods 
were more effective than the Court’s.  
At first glance, the use of black screen time with explanatory 
subtitles, as well as Im’s protest before international audiences, made the 
censorship, that is, the suppression of his politically-charged film, 
backfire. Yet, viewed from another angle, while Im’s international 
reputation has grown with the creation and release of The President's 
Last Bang, which is a good thing, the censorship did not really backfire 
– at least in terms of the film’s popularity. The film failed to make it into 
the top ten grossing domestic Korean films in 2005. 12  Its national 
audience reached a little over one million (1,083,962), which may seem 
large for domestic films in some countries such as Australia and Taiwan 
that face ongoing difficulties competing with Hollywood films – or even 
a less popular Korean film overshadowed by one of the top five grossing 
Korean blockbusters in a recent year. In other words, The President's 
Last Bang was far from the commercial behemoths of the cheonman 
younghwa or 10-million audience picture in the same era as The Host 
(2006) and King and the Clown (2005) as well as Taegukgi (2004) and 
Silmido (2003). At an estimated budget of $4.5 million USD, it was 
never meant to be a blockbuster. Nevertheless, it was meant to reach 
                                                          
12 In 2005, according to Korean Cinema 2005, the top five domestic films based 
on admissions in Seoul were: Welcome to Dongmakgol, MARATHON, Marrying 
The Mafia, Sympathy For Lady Vengeance, and Another Public Enemy (a.k.a. 
Public Enemy 2). In particular, the mainstream films MARATHON and Another 
Public Enemy competed heavily with The President's Last Bang because both 
films had been released in the week before it and both had gained wide appeal. 
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people, but given its promotion and advertising budget, it fell short of its 
target. 
Without question, The President's Last Bang attracted a smaller 
audience during the Lunar New Year holiday season than expected (in 
Korea and overseas), though the sensation surrounding its court order 
and its dark portrayal of Park Chung-hee made it relatively infamous at 
home. Low box office takings specifically resulted from it screening on 
a small number of screens in cinemas with a small number of seats – 
mostly thanks to CJ’s abrupt withdrawal as the film’s distributor. The 
film was released on about 190 screens with 31,000 seats, that is, half as 
many screens as the top five domestic films released in the same year. In 
other words, the film’s per-screen average was not very good. By 
comparison, Another Public Enemy opened on 370 screens (with 85,000 
seats) and MARATHON on roughly 300 screens (with 66,000 seats). 
Moreover, the film failed to attract large numbers of Twenty-somethings 
and Thirty-somethings, Korea’s biggest cinemagoing target audience. 
People in this age bracket simply had no desire to see the film. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that they could not identify with the story 
nor understand why President Park was assassinated to begin with.  
After the ruling, the film’s producers, MK Pictures, immediately 
appealed against the Court’s decision. In August 2006 they were 
successful in overturning the censorship decision. The deleted 
documentary footage was restored, but MK Pictures was forced to pay 
Park Ji-man about $106,000 USD for slandering his father’s character 
(Paquet 2006). Although harm to the film had already been done, Im and 
MK Pictures continued to stand up for their right to make a film that 
expressed different opinions and ideas. They stood for the principle 
behind freedom of expression. In any case, the punitive damage was 
hardly comparable to the hurdle producers had to overcome in January 
2005 when their co-distributor, CJ Entertainment – one of the largest 
vertically-integrated investors and controllers of domestic and 
international film distribution in Korea – withdrew its distribution 
commitments through its distribution channel CGV and venture capital 
amounting to about 20 per cent of the film’s total budget. Ramifications 
surrounding the film and its court case evidently spooked CJ 
Entertainment, thus resulting in the company’s apparent failure to resist 
the intimidation – even though Im was willing to stand up against the 
suppression of freedom of speech. This was a mighty blow for the 
attacked and a huge coup for the attacker because collective resistance, 
which is usually more effective than an individual’s efforts, was deterred.  
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Once more, Kino Video/Kino International based in New York, 
the company that holds the North American distribution rights to the 
film, has yet to release or see the need to carry the restored version of 
the film. Apparently something was lost in translation when the previous 
damaged (cut) version of the film was presented to audiences in North 
America. Video sales and theatrical releases failed to live up to 
expectations, and Kino has yet to make a return on its investment in the 
film. So in this sense, perhaps the censorship case didn’t backfire. 
Finally, in mid-2008 the film was restored to its original version and re-
released. It will be interesting to see how well the film sells. 
It may be that not everyone – especially right wing individuals 
who still worship Park – realizes that this is an intensely personal film 
for Im, who makes it clear in interviews that he had no intention to 
blame Park in the film. Rather, Im is one of the first 386 Generation 
filmmakers to invite audiences to stand back and to reexamine overt 
mythological views about Park – the man and not the precious myth. 
The film tests how much the public has overcome these accustomed 
views and whether or not Koreans have overcome their mourning for 
Park. Nearly thirty years later, in the mid-to-late 2000s, the fascism of 
Park and his entourage is meant to appear ridiculous as the protective 
layers of reverence are peeled away. The images in Figures 7, 8 and 9 
below portray this degree of absurdity rather well. Another (David 
Lynch-type) scene that comes to mind is when President's Chief 
Bodyguard Cha (while hiding in the President’s bathroom) desperately 
attempts to re-attach a finger to his hand after KCIA Director Kim 
shoots it off. Given the discussion presented here, I believe that it is 
precisely this exposing the rawness that is why Koreans felt so 
uncomfortable with this film. Scores of nameless right wing supporters 
who still worship Park were enraged while surprisingly so many others 
on the left who disdain Park remained silent – perhaps not really 
knowing how to react to or to comment on the film’s critical perspective. 
Only about 2% of the population wholly embraced this bold film by 
paying to see it at a public cinema. 
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Figure 7: President's Chief Bodyguard Cha (pictured in the 
background in his underpants speaking to President Park on the 
phone) and the President's Chief Secretary Yang (in the 
foreground picking his nose) getting ready for President Park’s 
last dinner. Permission by MK Pictures and SBS TV Australia. 
 
 
Figure 8: KCIA Director Kim in the bathroom after excusing 
himself from the dinner table. Permission by MK Pictures and 












Figure 9: Top administrators and military officials in President 
Park’s government saluting his lifeless body near the end of the 
film. Note the placement of a military cap on the President’s 
private parts. Permission by MK Pictures and SBS TV Australia. 




Tactic Attackers (Park Ji-
man/Seoul Court) 
Opponents (Im Sang-soo, 




Blocked the film’s 
exhibition by suing for 
defamation and libel. 
 
Attempted to cover-up the 
case and maintain distance 
between his politician 
sister and the case.  
Publicized information 
concerning the case in 
local newspapers and 
through interviews with 




struggle by exposing case 
details at the Cannes Film 
Festival, where The 
President's Last Bang was 
screened. 
 
Used black screen time in 
the film and explanations 
in subtitles as a vivid 





Focused on libellous 
nature of Im’s version of 
story. Devalued Im and 
film content by suggesting 
the film was highly 
fictitious. 
Re-valued/reaffirmed 
narrative content by 
indicating the film was 
based on thorough 
research. 
 
Film critics refer to Im as a 
high-quality, artistic and 
provocative filmmaker. 
Interpretations Claimed that documentary 
footage of funeral and 
protest marches blurred the 
boundary between fact and 
fiction. 
Focused on how freedom 
of speech was being 
suppressed after film 
censorship was thought to 
have been abolished. 
Use of channels Used Courts to lodge 
defamation suit and to 
apply pressure on CJ 
Entertainment – the film’s 
financial backer and 
distributor. 
Used Courts to lodge 
appeal. 




Park brings Im and the 
film to court. 
Im and the producers (as 
well as exhibitors and film 
festivals) resist by 
screening the film – albeit 
on a less than satisfactory 
number of screens.   
 
 
Korean Cinema Struggles 
 
Although the intimidation did not work against Im per se, the bulldozing 
litigation directly impacted on the film’s local and international 
distribution, thus effectively hindering the film’s global popularity and 
overall profitability. The point here is not to overstate the film's lack of 
success because according to statistics available on the Korean Film 
Council’s web site (www.kofic.or.kr), to date The President's Last Bang 
is one of Im's most successful films by admissions with 338,025 in 
Seoul and 1,083,962 nationally. By comparison, nationally The Old 
Garden sold about 300,000 tickets and The Good Lawyer's Wife sold 
1,750,000, while in Seoul only Tears sold nearly 25,000 and Girls' Night 
Out reached 290,502 admissions. Nevertheless, there is no easy way to 
tell how much more successful the film might have been if the legal 
attack had never occurred. There may have been other things going on 
that can help explain or at least contribute to the film’s (poor) reception 
by audiences at home and abroad. Without further questioning the film’s 
success or lack thereof, readers can decide for themselves if backfire 
actually occurred and/or imagine how things might have been different. 
Hopefully, this article will invite readers to take a closer look at the case 
and to re-scrutinize its significance in larger discussions about the 
oppression of freedom of expression. 
There are many hurdles the film industry has to overcome in 
order to continue achieving domestic and international accolades. 
Challenges facing Korea’s film industry, such as a different mode of 
censorship struggles raise difficult questions that must be answered 
before another decade of growth can be achieved. This time and these 
issues are pivotal, because they will dictate the future direction of the 
whole of the Korean film industry. Will the film industry continue to 
become more like Hollywood with its long-term and glorious history, or 
will the Korean cinema fade into the ranks of other popular national 
cinemas, joining the likes of Japan (1960s), Hong Kong (1970s) and 
 International Review of Korean Studies Vol.5, No. 1, 2008              59 
 
  
China (1980s)? I don’t profess to have all the answers, however, it is 
clear that filmmakers, activists, policy-makers and scholars are 
attempting to gain a better understanding about this era as part of a 
larger continuum of problems worth solving together. This is the kind of 
fighting spirit that has contributed to the backbone of the New Korean 
Cinema. 
All censorship is political, and all lines drawn by censorship 
regulators are moral lines drawn in the sand. That is, they are arbitrary 
and based on attitudes and values of a particular social, political and 
cultural milieu that change with time. Im is an agent of change as in the 
case of those of his peers who have also challenged the Ratings Board 
and the ratings system, surviving the intense censureship (blame and 
disapproval), controversy, lawsuits, verbal attacks and threats 
surrounding their films. As the author of the screenplay, and as in the 
case of so many highly regarded films in the contemporary Korean 
cinema released during its latest rise, Im vehemently stands by the way 
he brought the research material to life. The five films that Im has 
directed to date are ‘local’ in that they are linked to Korea’s modern 
social history. Nevertheless, his films like so many others belonging to 
his 386 Generation peers, such as Lee Chang-dong, Park Chan-wook, 
Kim Jee-woon, Hong Sang-soo and Kim Ki-duk, to name a few, have 
been regarded well outside of Korea, especially in France.13 In fact, one 
of the hallmarks of the Golden Age that has just passed is the critique of 
the human condition and the exploration of psychological circumstances 
in Korean stories, which carry a universal appeal. Undoubtedly, Im 
makes films that he personally finds interesting, and The President’s 
Last Bang shows producers and audiences all over the world that he is a 
director who is able to make big-budget films in addition to low-budget 
films about women, for which Im feels he is known. In similar ways to 
his contemporaries, Im has begun concentrating on international projects 
and has no immediate plan to return to Korea to make films. In this 
regard, he is someone who has escaped from Korea, deciding to remain 
in exile. 
As this article has attempted to show, a residual form of 
oppression exists in Korea, and it has undoubtedly detracted some of the 
limelight surrounding Korea’s domestic and export screen production 
industries. All of the challenges mentioned above are significant for 
                                                          
13  At the time of writing, Im was in Paris, preparing for his next project 
tentatively titled A Good Woman in Paris – a Korea-France co-production. 
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different reasons. Yet, censureship as in the case of censorship is 
important for larger social, cultural and political reasons because it is 
seen as one of the most significant hurdles for other film industries 
around the world to overcome – particularly as international co-
productions and collaborations take center stage and analogue industries 
jockey for position in new digital realms. At the time of writing, 
countries such as Australia, France, Korea and the US (and possibly 
India and Britain) are attempting to forge new co-production 
opportunities through formal treaty agreements with China – where 
existing censorship regulations deeply impact on the likelihood of 
domestic films (including co-productions) being made and foreign films 
being rated (under the single rating system) and shown at cinemas. 
Thinking about censorship in this global sense in which different 
cultures are converging is an exciting, but delicate matter, one in which 
it is hoped that we will continue to maintain an open dialogue. The 
dialogue has already begun in Korea where in late 2008 the 
Constitutional Court has decided that the limited screening rating for 
films with ‘objectionable’ content is now unconstitutional. Audiences 
can decide for themselves if they wish to see a film with such content, 
providing there is ample advanced warning about obscenity and violence. 
Perhaps by opening up this can of worms other non-Hollywood film 
industries can learn something from the Korean case; reflecting on one’s 
own society in a critical and satirical way may be somewhat painful, but 
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